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byL  lntroduction
Most people consider  student achievement  to be the prinary  objective of the United State's  multi-
billion dollar public school system. A  casual  examination  of the evidence  suggests  that a good portion of
those dollars are wasted - too many students  drop out, the students  who do graduate are not well-educated,
the proportion of administrators to teachers  seems  too high.  In fact, more rigorous analyses  support these
clairns. For example,  Hanushek (1986)  in his review of the literature on educational production fulctions
found no systematic  evidence  for a positive correlation between educational  expenditures  and educational
outcomes. Not a surprising conclusion,  but one that sarrants a deeper examination. In this paper, we
provide a methodolog/ by which individual schools  can be evaluated  on their use of inputs to produce
educational  outcomes. An examination of the individual scores  felds  information on the type of school
which is more likely to be wasting resources  and hopefulty suggests  a useful reform policy.
We use a distance  function to identify shadow  prices and to test for allocative inefficiency in Texas
school  districts. The methodology  yields  relative  measures  of resource  misallocation  for each  school  district,
We then compaie the measures  of inefficiency across  different types of school districts to determine whether
school district inefficiency is correlated with charact€ristics  of the student body or school district location.
In the following sectioq we discuss  the contribution to the literature of an analysis  of school efficiency
using distance  functions, We review the distance  function methodology  and specifu  the estimating model in
section 3.  We discuss  the data for this alalysis in section  4.  Section 5 presents  the results of our analysis
and  section  6 concludes.
II.  The Literature
Most of the literature on educational  production focuses  on the relationship between a single output
(usually  measured  with achievement  tests)  and  multiple  inputs  such  as  the characteristics  of schools  and
school  personnel,  levels  of expenditures  and characteristics  of students  and their families. Much of this  work
assumes,  either  implicitly  or explicitly,  that schools  are  efficient  in their endeavor  to educate  students.
llowever,  some  recent research  on public school performance takes a different tack.  Researchers
have refined their measurement and modeling techniques  to allow for multiple schooling outputs and toz
cxamine explicitly quostions  related to technical, allocative and scale  efficiencies.
One group of these stufies uses  data envelopment  analysis  (DEA)  to analyze  the technical efficiency
of schools. This technique readily models multiproduct technology  and identifies technical inefficiency as
deviations  ftom best practice performance  using mathematical programming techniques  which 'envelop' the
data. In this group are Bessent  (1980) and Bessent  et al. (1982,1983,  1984)  who analyze  public schools  in
Texas. Fiire, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1988)  use Missouri school district data to illustrate how to implement
DEA  for a cost-constrained  technolory.  Fiire, Grosskopf, and Weber (1989) use the same  Missouri school
district data to analyze  the technical efficiency of these  school districts in transforming vectors of inputs and
characteristics  into a vector of Missouri test scores. A  modified version of this technique has also been
employed  by Ray (forthcoming) for a sample  of Connecticut schools  and by McCarty and Yaisawarng  (1991)
for a sample of New Jersey  schools. They calculate  technical efficiency using standard DEA  techniques  but
include a second  stago  aralpis  to purge the technical efficiency measures  of effects  of home production and
factors which schools  cannot control using regression  techniques.
A  second  group of studies  emplop  a short run variable cost function approach to a\alye  education in
a multiproduct setting.  Included in this group is work by Jirnenez  (1986),  who analfzed primary and
secondary  education in Bolivia and Paraguay. He fiuds that these  schools  are not at optirnal scale,  and that
observed  levels  of fixed  inputs  are  not consistent  with long  run minimum  cost. Callan  and  Santerre  (1990)
use the same  general approach applied to school districts in Connecticut. They are particularly interested in
allowing for disaggregated  types of labor inputs in order to investigate  substitution possibilities among
(eachers  and administration, for example. Among other results, they find that support staff are substitutes
for instructional staff.
We improve and extend previous research  in four ways. First, we consftuct value-added  measures  of
output that allow us to isolate the contribution of the school to educational  achievement  by controlling for
previous achievement  and home inputs to the educational  process  (see Hanushek and Taylor 190).  Second,
we employ an input distance  function methodology  rather than multiproduct cost functions or DEA  to model
the production technolog'.  Unlike a cost function, which presumes  cost minimizing behavior, a distancr3
function has no embedded  behavioral objective ard therefore lends itself well to analyses  of the public sector.
Estimation of a distance  function also has the advantage  of examining  effrciency  in a stochastic  ftamework
rather thal  the non-stochastic  framework of the DEA  approach. Third  our estimation technique allows us
to test for allocative efficiency by calculating districtlevel  shadow  prices for inputs that, when compared to
observed  factor prices, indicate which factors (if any) are earning relative rents.  Fourth, we employ
bootstrapping techniques  to determine the statistical signifrcance  of our effrciency  measures.
III.  The Distance  Function
We model  technolog/  with a Shephard  (1953)  input distance  function. This function  is a mapping
from the set of all nonnegative  input vectors x = (xr, &, ..., xn) and nonnegative  output vectors y =  (y1,  yr, .."
yM)  into the real line,  i.e,,
D(y,x)  = max  {r:(y'(r))  is an element  in L(y)} (1)
wnerg
L(y) = {(x):  x can produce  y}.  (2)
The distance  function is perhaps  most easily  understood  with the aid of a diagram.  Consider Figure 1.
Observation  K employs  the input bundle (a,5) to produce output level y.  The distance  function seeks  the
largest  proportional  contraction  of that input bundle  which  allows  production  of the original  output  level  y
(which may be a vector).  In this example,  the value of the distance  function for observation  K is OK/OK  .
This illustrates  the following  characteristic  of the distance  function,  namely
D(y,*) >  1  <=>  xe  L(y).  (3)
Furthermore,  D(nx)  = 1 if and only  if the input bundle  is an element  of the isoquant  of L(y).l
The distance  function satisfies  fairly general regularity properties (see Fiire and Grosskopf (190)  for
'This measure  is related to Farrell (1957) technical effrciency. In fact, the Farrell input-saving  measure
of technical efficiency is the reciprocal of the value of the input distance  function.4
details), including being homogeneous  of degree  one in inputg concave  in inputs, convex  in outputs, and
nondecreasing  in inputs.  The distance  function is dual to the cost function; both functions completely
describe  tecbnolory.  Note that they have different data requirements;  whereas  both require data on outputs,
the distance  function requires data on input quantities rather than input prices.2  The distance  function has
the advantage  for our purposes  of being "agnostic"  with respect  to the economic  motivation of the decision
rnaker, unlike the cost firnction which presumes  cost minimizing behavior. In that sense,  the distance
function is much less restrictive; empirically, it merely identifies the boundary of the (best practice)
technolory.
As discussed  in Blackorby and Russell (1988) the first derivatives  of the input distance  function with
respect to input quantities ield  (cost-deflated)  shadow  or support prices of those inputs.  Since the input
distance  ftrnction is dual to the cost function, this follows from Shepharcfs  (dual) lemma, see,  Fiire and
Grosskopf  (1990). We can  use  these  shadow  prices  to test  for cost  minimizing  behavior. Let w =
(wt,wr.-wn),  where w is positive,  be the vector of observed  input prices. If a municipality is minimizing costs
then the following holds:
p,(v'*)/o:(v"t)  = wilwj,  for  all ii  = 1,4...N.  (4)
Dr is the frrst derivative of D(y,x) and is interpreted as the vhtual or shadow  price of the ith input.
Alternatively, we can define a measure  rcu  as the degree  to which the shadow  price ratio agees with the
actual price ratio, where the fomulation  in (5) follows the nonminimal cost literature,3
,"o = (D,(')/D,('))  /  w,/w,,  (5)
see for example  Tocla (196)  or Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986).
If  rcu  =  l  for all ij  then the observation  is said to b€ allocatively  effrcient. When,iij  t  l  we can have
2 In a cross-section  setting where prices do not vary, the distance  function provides a good empirical
alternative to the cost function.
3 In this literature, firms are assumed  to minimize (unobservable)  shadow costs  given (unobservable)
shadow  prices. This is achieved  by introducing  additional  parameters  into the cost  function  that essentially
allow input prices to "pivot".  These parameters  are used to construct the rcu  in equation 5.  Unlike the
distance  function methodolog5r,  this technique cannot identi& Iirm-specific r'elative  shadow  prices.the following  non-optimal  situations.  If
n->1,
factor  i is underutilized  relative  to j  at observed relative  prices,  and if
^,i < r,  a
factor i is overutilized relative to j  at observed  relative prices. Figure 2 illustrates for ru  < 1.  In this
diagram, relative shadow  prices are less  than the observed  relative prices. In other words, the absolute  value
of the slope of w w  is less  than the absolute  value of the slope of ww  Based  on observed  relative prices,
cost rninimizing employment occurs at the tangency  of the isoquant and q/u/  which is parallel to ww.  At  this
point, emplol,ment of input i is lower and emplo)ment of input j is higher than at the observed  employment
levels. Another way of interpreting a value of ru  < 1 is that the marginal product per dollar paid for input j
exceeds  the marginal product per dollar paid for input i at the observed  input mix and prices. That is, input
i is relatively underpaid and input j is relatively overpaid at the observed  input mix and prices.
Thus,  the input distance  function  can  be used  to model  multiple-output,  multiple-input  technology
without information on factor prices. By adding inlormation on observed  factor prices, the distance  function
can be used to t€st for allocative inefficiency.
IV.  The Data
The Texas  Research  League provides data for the 1988-89  school year on the number of teachers,
administrators,  staff and teacher aides employed  in each  Texas  school district, the average  salaries  paid to
each type of employee  and other school characteristics. Such labor data represent roughly 80 percent of
operating exPenditures  and probably capture all of the short-run decision  parameters  for school districts.
Altho'!,oh capital stocks are practically fixed in the short run, school district decisions  regarding the use
of labor clearly depend on the (exogenous)  stock of non-labor inputs.  Unfortunately, there are no direct
measures  of the quantities  or prices  of non-labor  inputs, Therefore,  because  expenditures  on maintenance
and  operations  should  be a function  of the size  of the capital  stock,  we use  data  on school  district
expenditures  on maintenance  and operations as our prory for the quantity of non-labor inputs
(6)6
(M&OINPUT).  By constructian, the observed  price per unit of these  nonlabor  inputs is one.a
The Texas Education Agency uses  the Texas  Educational Assessment  of Minirnun  Skills (TEAMS)
tests  to collect data on student achievement. However, as shown  by Hanushek and Taylor (190),  raw test
scores  are a poor prory for the actual output of the school slntem. We use the residual analysis  techniques
in Hanushek a:rd Taylor (1990) to estimate the value added by Texas school districts.  This approach also
yields an estinate of predicted achievement. We consider  the estimates  of predicted achievement  as
exogenous  frxed effects representing  horne production or the student input to the production process.
Specifically,  we estimate four measures  of school district output, using TEAMS  scores  in mathematics,
reading and writing  and demographic  data on the racial and socio-economic  composition of the student body
(Texas  Education Agency, 1987,  1989). For each of four grade levels -- 3rd, 5th,9th  and llth  -  we estimate
the value added by the school district according  to equation (8).
TEAMSS9i'  = o,  *  d,o NONWHITET  + D2d  SESi  + 
l6jr  TEAMS8Tjj,s_2 +  €i{ (8)
where TEAMSS9', is the average  total TEAMS  scores  for school district i for grade level g in 1989,
TEAMS8Ti;{.2  is the average  TEAMS  score in subject  j  (reading writing and mathematics)  for the same
cohort two years previously,  NONWHITp  is the fraction of the student body of school district i that is a
member of a minority group, SES,  is the fraction of the student body of school district i that is receiving free
or reduced-price  lunches (the best avai.lable  proxy for socio-economic  status), and the estimated  residual, e,n,
represents  the average  value added in school district i.  Because  the four value-added  equatioos  share
common regressors  (NONWHITEi  and SES), we suspected  a cross-equations  correlation between the error
terms, and therefore among our output measures. We found that the corelations between error terms were
surprisingly low (in the neighborhood  of 0.20),  but significant and therefore estimate the output measues
simultaneously  using the standard  SAS package  for seemingly  unrelated regression  (SUR).  We present these
equation  estimates  in Table 1.
Estimating  school  outputs  as  equation  residuals  generates  output  measures  that represent  deviations
4callan  and  Santerre  (1990)  use  a similar  prory for capital  stock.from the state average. School districts that add less  value than the state averags  have negative  output
measures. Since the dista.nce  function methodolory cannot handle negative  outputs, we hansform the value-
added residuals  into tractable output measures  by adding the estimated  value of the intercept from each
equation to the value-added  residual for that equation. Therefore,
ouTPUT.  - =4- + €.-
sTurNptrri,s  =  3,o  xot,twnrre  * ;ro sEs,  * i.6,o  reAln{ssz.n-, 
(10)
Thus STUINPUT  is our measure  of the contribution of home production, which we treat as a quasi-fixed
input,  i.e.,  an input over  which  the school  district  has  no controlj  OUTPUT is our prory of the value-added
of the school district.  It is the net gain in achielcnent  purged of the effect of home production and earlier
achievement  test gains.6
V.  Estimation
To estimate the distance  function a functional form for D(.)  must be chosen, In this analysis  we use a
translog form for the distance  function.  To avoid numerous econometric issues  in the estimation of the
5We also specified a model in which the variables  included in the right hand side of (10) were included
directly in the distance  function as quasi-frxed  inputs.  Our qualitative and quaatitative results were very
similar.
q[e  note that this general technique was also employed  by Callan and Santerre (1990) to arrive at a
measure  of educational quality.  However, Callan and Santerre did not have access  to pretest information
and therefore were unable to derive a value-added  quality measure.
(e)
anddistance  function T  we proceed  by estfuating only the share equations  which are derived from D(y,x) using
Shephard's  Dual Lemma (see  Fdre  and  Grosskopf  (1D0)).  Suppressing  the observational  subscript,  the
system  we gstimate is:




where x, is the quantity for endogenous  inputs (teachers,  administrators, staff and aides), zo is the quantity
for exogenous  inputs (STUINPUTs for 9=3,5,9, and 11 and M&OINPUT),  and y,  are the output quantities (OUTPUTs
for 9=3,5,9  and 1.1).  We impose  homogeneity  in the inputs: >p.  = 1,  Ep^  = 0, >p*  = 0, as  required  by
the defrnition of the input distance  function.
Dividing the predicted values  from the share equations  by the observed  input quantities yields input
shadow  prices that when compared  to data on the observed  factor prices generate  point estimates  of the ,itj
for each school district.  However, we would also like to be able to indicate whether or not those riij ale
significantly different from one, i.e., whether or not allocative efficiency is significantly violated.  Therefore,
we performed  a bootstrap  based  on the residuals  of the SUR estimation  of (11) to produce  confidence
intervals  for our point estimates.  The bootstrapping  procedure  involved  estimating  the system  100  times
using  randomly-selected  residuals  which  were  added  to the predicted  values  of the dependent  variables  to
create new "pseudo"  dependent  variables. We maintained the original covariance  structure by using the
residuals  from the same (randomly-selected)  observation  for each  of the four dependent  variables (see
Freedman and Peters (1984).  For each observation,  ws calculated  every rcu  100  tirnes.
Briefly, the bootstrap generates  a new distribution for each of the observations  in the sample. We can
then construct the empirical probability density function and cumulative distribution for each observation  (see
Efron 1982). If 95 percent of the estimated  rc,,s  for an observation are grcater 1, then we consider  the mean
7  Estimation of a system  of equations  including the share equations  and the distance  function raises
several  difficult econometric  problems.  First, the left.hand  side  of the distance  equation  is unobservable.
Second,  an intercept  cannot  be estimated.  While estimation  of the distance  function  by setting  the left hand
side equal to unity is feasible (see  Grosskopf and Hayes (1991)), we felt that the required instrumental
variables  approach  could  introduce  additional  problems  and  lead  to erroneous  predictions  from the share
equations,value of that ,rij to be statistically  greater than 1.  Similarly, if 95 percent of the estimated ,cijs  for an
observation  are less than 1, then we consider the mean lalue  of that rc,,  to be statistically less than 1.
VI.  Results
Mean rijs  that are statistically different from one signal allocative inefficienry.3 For example,  when
the marginal productivity of teachers  per dollar paid is significantly greater than the marginal productivity of
administrators per dollar paid(rc,.*0.., 
"o*no,o". 
>  1), then the school district is using relatively too few
teachers  and relatively too many adrninistrators  ceteris paribus. Similarly, when the marginal productivity of
teachers  per dollar paid is significantly less than the marginal productivity of support staff per dollar paid
(t,.""n*, o,o < 1), then the school district is over-utilizing teachers  relative to support staff.  Put differently, at
the observed  personnel m4  rcri >  1 implies that factor i is relatively underpaid and factor j is relatively
overpaid given their relative productivities. By the same  token, if  rij  <  I then factor i is relatively overpaid
and factor j  is relatively underpaid given their relative productivities.
Given four types of labor input (teachers,  administrators,  staff and teacher aides), there are six
dimensions  in which a school district could be allocatively  inefficient and therefore six relevant rcijs
(","r*"ooo.t*,-r".r  6t 
""rr"opt"n, 
6to"l".aiou"r  rcsdhinilrhro*  r.6r  f.a;'i"tor*,"ia*r  6o  6,"id*).  We  report  the
distributions  of the mean  rcus  in Tables  3 and  4.
We frnd that only 2 of the 604 school districts in the sample are allocatively efficient, i.e. rcy,  =  1 in all
six dimensions. On the other hand, no school district violated rc,; =  1 in all six dimensions. When
comparing one type of personnel  to any one other type of personnel Table 3 indicates that roughly 20
percent of the school districts choose  a cost-minimizing  mix of any two types of the labor inputs,
Interestingly, some patterns emerge  from the information on school districts that misallocate  their
resources. For er<ample,  if a school district is not using teachers  efliciently relative to administrators, the
school district is 2O  percent more likely to be relatively underpalng  its administrators than it is likely to be
sTechnically,  allocative efficiency obtains if all double ratios equal unity.  Once any double ratio does  not
equal unity, however,  it is not necessarily  true that other ratios becoming closer to unity implies an
improvement in efficiency or that fewer violations are bstter. That is, we are in the world of the second  best.10
relatively underpaying  its teachers  (nr.&b6..d6ini.rrrou  is greater than one 36 percent of the time and is less
than one 44 percent of the time).  If a school district is not using teachers  efficiently relative to aides,  it is
almost 70 percent more likely to be relatively underpafng its aides thal  it is likely to be relatively
underpaying  its teachers. In fact, school districts that usg aides  inefficiently relative to any other type of
personnel are more likely to be relatively underpaying  their ardes, Ttrat is, these school districts could reduce
costs  by substituting aides for the other employnent category ceteris padbus.
We would like to know why some school districts are not cost minimizers and why particular resources
are relatively overpaid or used relatively excessively.  We suspected  that rural school districts might be able
to exploit more monopoly power in the delivery of school services  than urban school districts, and thus that
rural school  districts  might  be subject  to less  consumer  pressure  for efficiency  than  urban  school  districts.
Therefore, we divided the sample based  on the census  definition which is based on the county in which the
school district is located and tested for differences  in the distributions of the rc.,s.
From Table 3, it is clear that when school districts misallocate  their resources  between  teachers  and
administrators or between teachers  and staff, rural school districts are more likely to overutilize teachers
(*,.*".i  <  1) while urban school districts are more likely to underutilize teachers(rc,"""*o,  >  1).  Further,
when school districts misallocate  their resources  between teachers  and aides,  both rural and urban school
districts tend to underutilize aides (rc,""*.***  <  1) but the tendency  is particularly strong in rural school
districts.  An a.nalysis  of variance  on ranks  of the rc.,  variables  in the urban  and  rural sub-samples  using  the
NPARIWAY  procedure in SAS support these conclusions.
These results suggested  that those rural school districts that are overutilizing teachers  and those urban
school districts that are overutilizing staff would be fruitful.  Specifically,  we were curious about whether or
not the same  school  districts  that cverutilized  teachers  relative  to administrators  also  overutilizrd  teachers
relative to staff.  Further, we wanted to determine the number of school districts that overutilized staff
relative to teachers  as well as staff relative to administrators. From Table 4. it is clear that rural school
districts are much more likely thau urban districts to overutilize teachers  relative to other types of personnel.Urban school districts have a higher probability of wasting staff relative to other types of personael.e
We also investigated  differenc€s  between  rural and urban school dishicts by sxapining the Pearson
correlations between the double ratios (n,,  s) and various revenue  and demographic  variables (the amount of
state aid per pupil  the total enrolLnent, and the racial and socio-economic  composition of the student body).
We found two hteresting relationships  that apply to both rural and urban school districts and one
relationship that was significant only for urban school districts.
First, we found evidence  that smaller school districts have  larger relative productivity wage gaps  than
do larger school districts.  For both urban and rural school districts that misallocate their resources  between
teachers  and administrators, the size of the productivity wage gap appears  to decline as the size of the school
district increases. For school disbicts that overutilize teachers  relative to adrninistrators
(Kr.mhdrdnhbinro'  <  1), we found a positive correlation between  enrollment and r,.-0"*-";**,"*.  Similarly,
for school districts that underutilize teachers  relative to administrators (n,*.o,"o.."o,oo  >  1) we found a
negative  correlation between enrollment and r,.*.o.o.r**,*.  We found similar patterns in the correlations
between enrollnent  and the r;1s for school districts that misallocate  their resources  between  teachers  and
staff and for school districts that misallocate  their resourc€s  between administrators and staff.  The tendency
for smaller school districts to make greater allocative errors than larger school districts may reflect either an
indivisibility problem at smaller schools  or the relatively greater ability of urban school districts to exert
market power over input prices,
We also found some evidence  that state aid may encourage  school districts to misallocate  their
resouces between teachers  and staff and between administrators ard staff.  For both urban and rural school
districts that misallocate their resources  between  administrators and staft  the size of the productivity wage
gap appears  to increase  as the level of state aid increases. Further, in urban school districts that overutilize
staff relative to teachers,  we found a positive correlation betweetr  rtcacrr*sae  and the level of state aid per
pupil.  Similarly, in rura.l school districts that overutilize teachers  relative to staff, we found a negative
correlation between rracrcartaa  and the level of state aid per pupil.  These relationships  suggest  either that
'Again, we note that these are seccnd  best situations.T2
something  in the state aid formula encourages  iaefficiency, or that school districts have fswer incentives  to be
elficient with the state's money.
We found one interesting relationship that appears  to hold only for school districts in urban counties.
Whenevet an urban school district underutilizes aides  relative to some  other type of personnel the
productivity wage  gap for teachers,  administrators and staff (relative to aides) increases  as the percentage  of
minority  or low-income  students  increases,
VII.  Conclusions
Using an input distance  function to model the relationship among the multiple inputs and multiple
outputs of Tenas  school districts"  we find evidence  of widespread  a.llocative  inefficiency. Only 2 of the 604
school districts in our sample efficiently allocated their labor resources  among teachers,  administrators, staff
and aides. In all other school districts, the ratio of relative marginal productivities to relative wages  was
significantly different from one for at least one combination of labor inputs.  This suggests  that obs€rved
relative input prices do not reflect relative productivity in Texas school districts and could cause  bias if used
to estimate a cost function, for exarnple. Violation of allocative elficiency also implies that Shephard's
lemma is no longer valid; shadow  prices should be used  instead of observed  prices,
We found evidence  of a few patterns in the distribution of the ratio of relative shadow  to observed
input prices. We found that when school districts misallocate  resources  between administrators and teachers,
urban  school  districts  tended  to overutilize  administrators  while rural school  districts  tended  to overutilize
teachers.  We also  found  that urban  school  districts  were  particularly  prone  to overutilize  staff  and  that
larger school districts had smaller gaps  between relative shadow  and observed  wages  than did smaller school
districts,  Finally we fouad some evidence  that the school financing formula in the state widened the
productivity wage  gap and that school districts in urban areas  with disadvantaged  student bodies had
systematically  higher productivities per dollar paid to teachers  aides  relative to all other types of labor.
Our work provides an alternative to DEA  analysis  or the estimation of cost functions in the
multiproduct setting typical of the education  sector. Further, our results suggest  that estimation of a cost
function using observed  input prices may cause  bias and violation of Shephard's  lernma.IJ
Table I
Output Estimation






















































System  weighted R-square is 0.416914
Table 2
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Distribution of School Districts
Based  on consistent  over(under)-  utilization














































Input  Dlstance  Function:  n(yK,*K)  = oK/oKrt8
Figure  2
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Appendix Table 2 (Continued)
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